The discussion on the position of arbitration in the Brussels Jurisdiction and Enforcement Regulation (Regulation 44/ 2001) has now reached the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament.

Just to remind those less familiar with the issue: the present Regulation, as well as the preceding Jurisdiction Convention, allowed courts in EU countries to assume jurisdiction over a contract in spite of an arbitration clause whenever that court decided that the arbitration clause, although binding under the law of the contract and the law of the seat of arbitration, was invalid under its domestic law. They can do so because Art. II of the New York Convention, that obliges state courts to refer disputes to arbitration whenever there is a valid arbitration agreement, does not indicate under which law that validity has to be assessed.

Belgian courts thus for instance frequently assume jurisdiction over the termination of Belgian distributor agreements, although governed by foreign law, because a mandatory 1961 statute forbids arbitration. On January 14, 2010 the Belgian Court of Cassation once more has confirmed that an arbitration clause in a distribution contract governed by Californian law and validly providing for ICC arbitration in Paris under the proper law of the contract and under the law of the seat of arbitration, was nevertheless null and void under the Belgian 1961 statute. Consequently the lower court was entitled to grant substantial compensation for termination under the Belgian 1961 statute. In the case at stake the Californian manufacturer had not even bothered to start an arbitration – probably because he considered the Belgian judgment unenforceable in the USA. Matters would be different when the manufacturer would have assets within the European Union and the Belgian judgment would have been enforceable all over the European Union under Regulation. He could have started the arbitration expecting that the arbitrators would not have granted compensation or less compensation under Californian law. The award, however, would have a limited impact. Its enforceability or recognition under the New York Convention would not block the enforcement of the Belgian judgment elsewhere in the European Union under Regulation 44/ 2001.

The English West Tankers decision, which lead to parallel proceedings before an Italian court and English arbitrators because the Italian court decided that under Italian law the arbitration clause was not effective, has drawn much international attention but is another illustration of the inconvenience of parallel proceedings.

The Jurisdiction Regulation will be amended by 2011. Whether and how the Regulation should avoid parallel arbitration and court proceedings as well as ignorance of the award at the enforcement stage, is being heavily debated for many months. The Heidelberg Report suggested to better integrate arbitration within the Regulation. In its Green Book the European, Commission solicited comments and suggestions from the arbitration community. The consultation was broad: over one hundred suggestions were submitted, going from a full integration of the arbitration process in the Regulation to its absolute exclusion.

It is interesting that the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament has opted for the latter extreme in its Report on the Implementation and Review of Regulation 44/2001 of a few days ago, i.e. June 28, 2010: the absolute exclusion.

The Committee thus wants to undo the Marc Rich decision. In that case the European Court had decided that a judgement on the merits remains under the Jurisdiction Convention, i.e. the predecessor of Regulation 44/2001, even when the respondent has objected to the state court’s jurisdiction because of an arbitration clause. The Committee would also exclude such judgment from the scope of the Regulation: “not only arbitration proceedings, but also judicial procedures ruling on the validity or extent of arbitral competence as a principal issue or as an incidental or preliminary question are excluded from the scope of the Regulation”. The practical implication of this approach would be that a judgment becomes not enforceable under the Regulation as soon as the Respondent invokes an arbitration clause – even if this clause would be blatantly invalid.

With regard to the court’s powers to sustain arbitration proceedings, the Committee clearly prefers the pre- West Tankers world where the seat of the arbitration had full autonomy to avoid court proceedings elsewhere:

“Whereas the various national procedural devices developed to protect arbitral jurisdiction (anti-suit injunctions so long as they are in conformity with free movement of persons and fundamental rights,….) must continue to be available and the effect of such procedures … must be left to the law of those Member States as was the position prior to the judgment in West Tankers”.

Although the Committee wants the new Regulation to absolutely exclude arbitration from its scope, it admits arbitration nevertheless through the backdoor. Whenever a judgment on the merits was rendered because the court deemed the arbitration clause invalid, the Regulation would deny enforcement whenever that court “disregarded a rule of the law of arbitration in the Member State in which enforcement is sought, unless the judgment produces the same result as if the law of arbitration of the Member State in which enforcement is sought had been applied”. Under the New York Convention an award may not be enforceable whenever under the law of the country of enforcement, there is no valid arbitration clause. For the Committee a judgment from an EU country would become unenforceable whenever, under the law of the country of enforcement, there would be a valid arbitration clause.

The Committee furthermore does not want to give exclusive jurisdiction to the court of the seat for ancillary court proceedings such as the nomination, challenges and replacement of arbitrators, the setting aside of the award:

“ Exclusive jurisdiction could give rise to considerable perturbations It appears from the intense debate raised by the proposal to create an exclusive head of jurisdiction for court proceedings supporting arbitration in the civil courts of the Member States that the Member States have not reached a common position thereon and that it would be counterproductive, having regard to world competition in this area, to try to force their hand”.

One can deplore that in this way courts of many jurisdictions may interfere with the arbitration proceedings. Probably it would be useful to define the ancillary proceedings which will be of the exclusive competence of the court of the seat while recognizing that other courts, with a sufficient link with the case, may take provisional measures.

The Committee’s proposal clearly opts for arbitration. As soon as an arbitration clause is at stake, each EU state is freed from the jurisdictional constraints of the Regulation. However, judgments rendered will nevertheless be enforceable under the Regulation in a court of another EU state as long as the view of that court on the validity and scope of the arbitration clause is compatible with that of the court which rendered the judgment.

The Committee is certainly not the whole European Parliament, which may reach completely different conclusions. Moreover, the European Commission most probably will elaborate its own proposal by the end of this year. However, the Committee’s report is certainly the start of intensive discussions among the Community bodies.

When discussing public policy, English lawyers like to quote the famous comment of an English judge in the early 19th century that “public policy is a very unruly horse, and once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you”.

Recent history shows how difficult it is to ride the ‘unruly horse’; most attempts to resist enforcement on grounds of public policy fail. But it remains a live issue, as the recent decision of the English court in Heinz v EFL illustrates.

Heinz revisits the thorny question of whether an enforcing court may re-open a decision of the tribunal in relation to an issue of public policy. This, of course, brings into play two potentially conflicting principles: the finality of arbitration awards and non-enforcement of awards which violate public policy.

Unsurprisingly, this issue has come up before in England, notably in three cases all dating from around 2000 – Westacre, Soleimany and Hilmarton.

Westacre concerned an attempt to resist enforcement in England of a Swiss award, on the basis of evidence which had not been produced at the hearing. This evidence was alleged to show, first, that the award had been procured by perjury and, second, that the contract was tainted by bribery.

On the perjury point, the Court of Appeal broadly speaking adopted the test applicable in English litigation, such that so-called “fresh evidence” may only be considered if it was not available to the party at the time of the hearing and is sufficiently strong that it may reasonably be expected to have been decisive at the hearing. On the basis of the facts of that case, it refused to consider the evidence.

As to the second point, the court found that it was clear from the award that the bribery allegation was rejected by the tribunal and refused to re-open the point. The award was therefore enforced.

Soleimany was different. It concerned an English arbitration which was conducted before the Beth Din, which applies Jewish law. It was apparent from the face of the award that the contract in question related to smuggling carpets and that the arbitrator considered that illegality was irrelevant as a matter of Jewish law. The English court found that it would be against English public policy to enforce an award which in turn enforces an illegal contract, but there was no question of re-opening the arbitrator’s findings of fact or law.

In Hilmarton, the attempt to resist enforcement of another Swiss award failed. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the English court commented that it would be “quite wrong” for it to entertain any attempt to go beyond the arbitrator’s “explicit and vital” finding of fact that there had been no bribery or corrupt activity. That left a question as to whether enforcement could be resisted in England on grounds of illegality under the place of performance which did not offend Swiss law (as the governing law of the contract) or Swiss public policy. The court held it could not and enforced the award. (There is an entirely separate discussion about how Hilmarton and Soleimany should be reconciled.)

That brings us then to Heinz. In the arbitration (which was seated in Hungary), EFL claimed damages in relation to three distribution agreements between it and third parties. Heinz argued that these distribution agreements were “shams”, entered into solely for the purpose of inflating EFL’s damages claim. The tribunal found that Heinz had not proved this allegation and awarded EFL damages in relation to those agreements.

Having failed to have the award set aside in the Hungarian courts, Heinz sought to prevent ELF enforcing the award in England on grounds of public policy. It argued – on the basis of fresh evidence it had gathered since the award – that the distribution agreements were forgeries.

The key issue was therefore whether Heinz was entitled to rely on the fresh evidence of forgery to counter the Tribunal’s finding as to the distribution agreements – that is, the first limb of the discussion in Westacre. On the facts, this boiled down to the question of whether the evidence was reasonably available to Heinz at the time of the hearing.

ELF argued that a reasonable solicitor could have discovered this evidence during the arbitration and that the “fresh evidence” test was not therefore satisfied. The judge held, however, that it was at least arguable that the proper test is whether Heinz and its solicitors should have discovered the evidence (i.e. whether they acted reasonably). He then found that it was arguable that Heinz’s failure to investigate “the opposite camp” before the hearing did not represent a failure to act reasonably.

Pausing there for some technical background, this was a summary judgment application, which meant that ELF had to show that Heinz’s arguments had no real prospect of success. The judge’s finding that Heinz’s position was arguable was therefore sufficient to dispose of the application, such that the case will now proceed to trial.

So what does Heinz mean? On its face, it is limited to cases where a party argues, based on fresh evidence, that an award has been obtained fraudulently. It is different, therefore, to cases like Hilmarton or the bribery limb of Westacre. But the point remains that alleging perjury or fraud in obtaining an award is still another way of seeking to re-open a tribunal’s findings of fact in enforcement proceedings. As was observed in the first instance court in Westacre, it represents an open invitation for a disappointed party to re-litigate a New York Convention award at the enforcement stage.

This invitation is, however, limited to situations where the disappointed party can point to fresh evidence. Much depends, therefore, on where the line is drawn in terms of the admissibility of such evidence. This should be explored at trial in Heinz, making it one to keep an eye on.

An interesting issue regarding the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards, in relation to the provisions of the New York Convention of 1958 and its alleged conflict with domestic Greek Civil Code provisions in relation to conflict of laws and public policy doctrines arose in Greek jurisdiction. The matter is of specific interest as the dispute went all the way up to the Supreme Court for determining the viability of enforcing the particular foreign arbitral award in Greece.

The actual arbitration dispute arose in late 2004 in relation to a distribution agreement of 1998 between an American and a Greek company regarding medical equipment. The parties’ contractual arbitration clause called for an arbitration proceeding under the auspices of the International Center for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association. Both parties expressly submitted to arbitration after the dispute arose, and recognized the competence of the appointed sole arbitrator (the “Arbitrator”) to decide the matter.

The Claimant (the American company) filed a claim for the amount of 1.062.655,33 US$ while the Respondent (the Greek company) counter-claimed unspecified damages estimated at the time of filing to be between 1-5 million US$. The arbitration hearings took place between 15-18 August 2005 in the USA, and an interim decision was issued by the Arbitrator on the acceptance of the change of the claimant’s company name, which took place at that time. On 6 September 2005 a final reasoned arbitration award was issued. The Arbitrator decided in favor of the Claimant and determined that the total amount due to the Claimant was 1.137.117,00 US$.

When the Claimant attempted to enforce the award in Greece on the basis of the provisions of the NY Convention of 1958, it was met with resistance by the Respondent who filed various objections against its enforceability. Thus the matter went through all instances of civil courts’ jurisdictions in Greece and found its way to the highest level (Areios Pagos/ Supreme Court) in civil law matters.

The Supreme Court was called to examine various alleged legal flaws and issued a comforting decision to proponents of ADR of both domestic and international level, as it highlighted and supported the viability of enforcing foreign arbitral awards in Greece, a matter that for a number of years has been in real need of such clarification from the highest judicial body, for securing the smooth foreign arbitration awards enforcement in Greece.

The Supreme Court’s approach on the issues before it, which concentrated on whether there were any legal flaws in the earlier Court of Appeal’s ruling, was rather careful and well-balanced. The Court made it quite obvious from the beginning of its rationale that the purpose of the proceeding was not to re-examine the arbitral award on the merits, as an “appeal” against it is not allowed by law. Furthermore, the Court noted that the three-month deadline following the issuance of the foreign arbitral award had elapsed with neither party filing a request for rectification or vacation as provided by the relevant Affidavit and Rules of the International Center for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association.

As such the Court went through the various objections made by the Respondent on the issues related to the actual enforceability of the award in Greece, namely that the enforcement of the award violates the provisions of article 5(2)(b) of the NY Convention of 1958, and is against the public policy of Greece, and rejected, ab initio, the following three objections made by the Respondent holding that as per the earlier Court of Appeal’s decision that they did not relate to enforcement issues per se but rather attempted to re-examine the issues on the merits, namely:

a. that the arbitration award failed to take into account the provisions of Article 81 of the EEC which prohibits discriminative policies and hindrance of competition in terms of invoicing policies.
b. That the arbitration award violated the Directive 86/653 EC and the Greek Presidential Decree 219/1991 regarding damages afforded to distributors.
c. That the contractual party in the Distribution Agreement was a different entity to the company that acted as the Claimant in the actual arbitration proceeding.

The Court therefore turned its focus on the Respondent’s objection that

a. the arbitration award lacked reasoning and;
b. the scope of the arbitration clause did not encompass the dispute at issue and therefore that the Arbitrator lacked or exceeded its competence in determining the matter and issuing the arbitration award.

The Supreme Court focused on the earlier determination of the Court of Appeal’s decision and while it held that it partially and indirectly violated the relevant conflict of laws and public policy provisions of both the NY Convention of 1958 and the Greek Civil Code by failing to actually examine the above allegations in full prior to issuing its decision, it still affirmed the earlier ruling and held in favor of the enforcement of the foreign arbitral award as it determined that no conflict of laws or public policy considerations should preclude its enforcement. The Court found that the allegations on lack of reasoning and lack of “competence” relating to the arbitration proceeding were unsubstantiated and dismissible. In doing so the Supreme Court confirmed the enforceability and proper application of international arbitration principles and norms in the Greek jurisdiction and fortified the viability and effectiveness of international ADR proceedings in Greece.

Under the Russian legal system, the last resort a party has with respect to challanging a court decision is to apply to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation with a claim to review the decision’s compliance with the Russian Constitution in terms of the provisions of laws and/or regulations applied by lower courts. There are very few cases in which the Constitutional Court opined on matters related to international arbitration.

Since the adoption of the Law “On International Commercial Arbitration” founded on the UNCITRAL Model Law, the compliance of its provisions with the Russian Constitution has been challenged four times. Three times the subject of the challenge was Article 34 (“Application for setting aside as exclusive recourse against an arbitral award”) and/or Article 35 (“Recognition and enforcement”) in 1999, 2000 and 2001. The applicants, in particular, alleged that the limited range of grounds for setting aside an arbitral award or for refusal to recognize and enforce an award established by the said articles infringed upon the party’s right to judicial protection, which includes the right of recourse against any judgment or award rendered against a party. In each claim, the Constitutional Court refused to review the constitutionality of these provisions finding that the applications were inadmissible as the said provisions nowise violated the constitutional rights of the applicants. The rationale of the court contributed to the development of making the jurisprudence more favorable to international commercial arbitration. Thus, in its decision of October 26 2000 No. 214-О the court stated that “the applicants while entering into the contract failed to exercise their right to provide for resolution of the arising disputes by commercial court procedure, but instead signed an arbitration agreement (clause) on submission of them to arbitration under the Law of the Russian Federation “On International Commercial Arbitration”. Thus, having exercised their right of freedom of contract, they voluntarily chose this particular dispute resolution technique and agreed to comply with the rules established for international commercial arbitration court”.

Furthermore, in May 2009 the Constitutional Court ruled on international arbitration in its decision of May 28, 2009 No. 623-O-O. This time it examined an application challenging the constitutionality of the Article 16(3) “Competence of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction” of the Law “On International Commercial Arbitration”. In my opinion, the case is interesting and even in some way bizarre, thus it deserves a closer look.

A foreign company Mellain LLC filed a claim before the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICAC) to recover contractual debts from a Russian company. The ICAC ruled on its jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The Russian state courts of the first and cassation tiers set aside the ruling on the ground that the arbitration agreement was made by the claimant with another Russian company which did not act on behalf of the respondent. The courts rejected the arguments of Mellain LLC about the respondent having missed the time limit for submitting his application to the state court for setting aside the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on its jurisdiction.

Mellain LLC applied to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation challenging, in particular, the constitutionality of the provision of Article 16(3) of the Law “On International Commercial Arbitration” which provides that “the arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph (2) of this article [on the absence of jurisdiction] either as a preliminary question or in an award on the merits. If the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within thirty days after having received notice of that ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall be subject to no appeal. While such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award”.

The applicant argued that the wordings “within thirty days after having received notice of that ruling” lacked clarity as it failed to specify the moment of commencement of the period for filing the application to set aside the ruling of the arbitral tribunal as a preliminary question on its competence. On this ground the claimant alleged that it is contrary to Article 46 of the Constitution which provides that “everyone is guaranteed judicial protection of his rights and liberties”.

Furthermore, the applicant requested the Constitutional Court to review the ICAC ruling and to compel the ICAC and the Russian specialized professional periodical “International Commercial Arbitration” to publish a research paper on the competence of ICAC. Unsurprisingly, the Constitutional Court rejected these requests noting that resolving such matters falls beyond the competence of the Constitutional Court.

The Constitutional Court found that the ICAC Rules clearly specify the procedure for mailing and delivering the documents by the ICAC Secretariat. The court noted that the Rules in force as of the time of the dispute in question provided in Paragraph 12(2) that “the statements of claim, statements of defence, notices of the hearing, arbitral awards, rulings and orders shall be sent by registered mail with return receipt requested, or otherwise, provided that a record is made of the attempt to deliver the mail”. (The ICAC Rules that are currently in force have practically the same wordings of Article 16(3)). The Constitutional Court concluded that Article 16(3) considering its application together with the Arbitration Rules of the ICAC cannot be interpreted as lacking clarity.

Indeed, Article 16(3) of the Law on International Commercial Arbitration does not need to provide details on how to prove the exact time a notice of the ruling was received by each party. However, such details should be specified elsewhere, namely in the applicable arbitration rules.

I am grateful to Professor Hess for his comments on my 3 March 2010 blog. It greatly contributes to advancing the debate. However, it also perfectly illustrates the difficulties of a proposition – the total or partial deletion of the arbitration exception in Regulation 44/2001 – that has not been sufficiently thought through.

1. Professor Hess now introduces a very significant change in the Heidelberg proposal.

In his 14 February post on ConflictsofLaw.net, he had acknowledged that “the proposal of the Heidelberg Report to delete the arbitration exception entirely maybe goes too far”.

Professor Hess now proposes for the first time an alternative to the Heidelberg proposal by drafting Article 1-2 (d) of the Regulation as follows “The Regulation shall not apply to… (d) Arbitration, save supporting measures and declaratory relief proceedings as provided for under Articles 22(6), Article 27A and Article 31”.

In other words, the arbitration exception would not de deleted, as initially proposed by the Heidelberg Report, but maintained, save for ancillary proceedings (proposed new Article 22(6)), for the proposed new declaratory action (new Article 27A), as well as for provisional and conservatory measures (Article 31).

The question which immediately arises is therefore: what about court decisions which do not fall within the three limited exceptions to the exception? Will a court decision on the validity of an arbitration agreement or of an award still be excluded from the scope of the Regulation?

Normally, one would tend to answer positively to that question. If the arbitration exception is maintained (although with limited exceptions), it is hard to see why a judgment annulling an award should be recognized under the Regulation. Putrabali would thus survive to the new Regulation.

And what about a judgment on the validity of the arbitration agreement? Here, a distinction would have to be made.

In case of a judgment rendered at the seat of the arbitration in the context of the proposed new declaratory action, one would have to admit, under the amended Hess proposal, that it should be recognized under the Regulation.

If, on the contrary, the judgment is not rendered at the seat (or rendered at the seat but not in the context of a declaratory action), what would the situation be?

Then, March Rich is likely to survive.

If the main scope of the action giving rise to the judgment is the validity of the arbitration agreement, the judgment would thus presumably fall outside the scope of the Regulation.

But the situation would be more difficult in the case of an interim judgment on the validity of the arbitration agreement rendered by a court seized on the merits. There, as it is known, the Court of Appeals of Paris answered by excluding the application of the Regulation in Fincantieri (Paris, 15 June 2006, Legal Department du Ministère de la Justice de la République d’Irak v/ Sociétés Fincantieri Cantieri Navali Italiani, Finmeccanica et Armamenti e Aerospazio, Rev. Arb. 2007.90, note Bollée), while the English Court of Appeals admitted that the Regulation is applicable in Endesa (National Navigation Co c. Endesa Generacion SA, [2009] EWCA Civ 1397 ). Which of those two solutions should prevail?

Professor Hess, however, seems to follow an entirely different line of reasoning. He in fact rejects my proposal for a safeguard clause inspired from Article IX of the Geneva Convention (new Article 34A). Let me recall that my proposed clause would read as follows:

“A judgment shall also not be recognized:

(a) if it has been rendered in disregard of a valid arbitration agreement that is valid under the law of the country of recognition;
(b) as regards judgments rendered on the validity of an award, if (i) it has not been rendered by the courts of the country where the arbitration has its seat, or (ii) in case of annulment of the award, if it was not made on one of the grounds set out in Article V(1)(a) to (d) of the New York Convention”.

Such proposal was made on the assumption that the arbitration exception would be entirely deleted, with the consequence that a judgment rendered in a Member State deciding on the validity of an award would fall within the scope of the Regulation and would have to be recognized (possibly with no formalities or requirement of exequatur under the new regime).

It would however become unnecessary in case the arbitration exception is maintained with limited exceptions, as suggested by Professor Hess. In such case, a judgment deciding on the validity of an arbitral award should in fact fall outside the scope of the Regulation and have to be recognized under the general private international rules of the country of recognition.

Professor Hess, however, does not reject my proposal on the basis that it becomes unnecessary under the limited arbitration exception that he suggests.

In order to justify his rejection of such a provision, Professor Hess states that it would “completely runs counter the objective of the ongoing reform of Brussels I which shall reduce the grounds of non-recognition and replace exequatur proceedings by the principle of mutual trust”.

One has therefore to understand that, under Professor Hess proposed limited arbitration exception, a judgment rendered in a Member State on the validity of an arbitral award would have to be recognized under the principle of “mutual trust”.

Why it should be so is unclear. But if this assumption is correct, and although Professor Hess declares that he “[does] not want to discuss the issue in more detail”, the question deserves much more attention.

For example: under the New York Convention, awards may be annulled at the seat, and courts in other countries may only refuse recognition on the limited grounds provided in Article V. Let us now imagine a Member State court in a country other than the seat of the arbitration which would annul a foreign award. This is by no means an unimaginable situation. It has occurred in India and elsewhere (See recently: Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd, Supreme Court of India, 10 January 2008). Under Professor Hess’ suggestion (if I understood him well), such a decision would have to be automatically recognized under the Regulation in all other Member States. I trust that Professor Hess will accept that this would be plainly incompatible with the New York Convention.

Second example: a court in a EU Member State where the seat of the arbitration is located and which is also a member of the Geneva Convention of 1961 annuls an award for reasons not contemplated by Article V (1) (a) to (d) of the New York Convention. Recognition of said decision is sought in another Member State which is also a party to the Geneva Convention. Based on the principle of “mutual trust”, automatic recognition would prevent the enforcement of the arbitral award, in breach of Article IX of said Convention when applicable.

It is thus evident that, if the arbitration exception is to be totally or partially deleted in a way that would include judgments on the validity of an arbitral award in the scope of the Regulation, exceptions would need to be framed in order to make the Regulation compatible with the New York and Geneva Convention and to take into account the specificities of arbitration.

2. Let us now turn to the other punctus doli of the Hess/Heidelberg proposal: the automatic lis pendens provision of Article 27 and the proposed declaratory action.

I have expressed the legitimate concern that the proposed new Article 27A will not be compatible with the negative effect of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, as it is applied for example in France.

I have accordingly proposed to vary the proposed new Article 27A of the Regulation as follows:

“A court of a Member State shall stay the proceedings once the defendant contests the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the existence and scope of the arbitration agreement (i) if a court of a Member State that is designated as the place of the arbitration is seized for declaratory relief in respect to the existence, the validity, and/or scope of that arbitration agreement, or (ii) if a judge at the seat of the arbitration has been seized to put the arbitration in motion or has been seized of a difficulty relating to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, or (iii) if an arbitral tribunal, sitting in or outside the European Union, has been seized of said question”.

Professor Hess maintains that “French procedural law explicitly provides for declaratory relief in the context of arbitration (if the juge d’appui finds the clause is manifestly void)” and adds that “it seems to me possible that a French juge d’appui who is seized by a party under Article 22 (6) JR will stay his proceedings and send the parties to arbitration”. Professor Hess adds that “If the arbitral tribunal finds that the clause is effective, it may give an interim award. The French juge d’appui can endorse the award (by a declaratory judgment). This judgment will be recognized in all other EU-Member States and the prevalence of the arbitration proceedings will be assured”.

Such statements are a bit confusing. As explained in my blog, proceedings before the juge d’appui are my no means comparable to declaratory proceedings. The juge d’appui does not take any decision on the validity of the arbitration agreement. He just puts the arbitration in motion (for example by appointing an arbitrator) unless the arbitration agreement is manifestly null and void. If the judge is seized on the merits, he will decline jurisdiction (not stay his proceedings) and refer the parties back to arbitration unless the clause is manifestly null or inoperative. There is no possible “stay” of the proceedings before the juge d’appui. Either the arbitration agreement is manifestly null or inoperative, and he will not put the arbitration into motion, or it is not, and he will send the parties to submit their jurisdictional objections to the arbitral tribunal.

Whatever Professor Hess meant in his analysis of the situation before the French juge d’appui, he seems to be in agreement that, in presence of an action in the merits before a Member State court where it is argued that the arbitration agreement is null and void, or even manifestly null and void, a judge in another Member State where the arbitration has its seat could nevertheless put the arbitration in motion by for example appointing an arbitrator. In such a scenario, the arbitration could proceed with no need for the judge to “endorse the award by a declaratory judgment” along the lines suggested by Professor Hess.

This is welcomed and – if this understanding is correct – Professor Hess should agree that Article 27A should be amended as suggested above.

3. I also have pointed out that the proposed declaratory action will not prevent situations of lis pendens between an action in the merits in breach of an arbitration agreement and an action to enforce an award in a country other than the seat, thus de facto obliging the parties to return to the old requirement of double exequatur that he New York Convention has suppressed.

To that effect, I have proposed a new Article 27B drafted as follows: “Article 27 shall not apply to the court of a Member State requested to enforce an arbitration award”.

Professor Hess did not comment this proposed new article. I hope he is also in agreement with this proposal.

4. Finally, I would like to make some comments on Eco Swiss and the public policy defense to enforcement, as this issue seems to be at the root of our disagreements.

Professor Hess maintains that “the objective of the NYC is certainly to provide for a uniform regime on the recognition of arbitral clauses and awards”. With due respect, I disagree. The scope of the NYC is to provide for a minimum threshold of recognition, not to unify the regime of recognition of arbitral clauses and awards.

Professor Hess then wonders “whether the EU-Member States are still free to interpret and apply the public policy exception of Article V NYC individually”. Professor Hess’ answer to that query is that: “the public policy clause of Article V (1) (c) of the New York Convention must be interpreted coherently within the EU” and that “eventually, the courts of the Member States must refer questions on the interpretation of mandatory EU law to the ECJ (Article 267 TFEU)”.

This calls for two observations.

First: as a general matter, I of course agree that, within the EU, courts should as much as possible apply EU mandatory laws in a coherent and uniform manner.

But, with due respect, this is not the issue which is debated with respect to the application of the public policy exception in the context of courts review of arbitral awards.

The true issue is that of procedural autonomy, i.e. whether Members States can be more or less intrusive in their review of arbitral awards. As I have shown in a recent study (note to SNF v Cytec, Cass. 4 June 2008, Clunet 2008, 1107), most jurisdictions in the EU would set aside an award only in case of a manifest or a flagrant breach of public policy (like in the Thalès case, a decision which is criticized by some, but which is rightly approved by most, including by such authors as Professor Schlosser, see: Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty and Arbitration: a German perspective, Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 2009-1, p. 22,).

This is not the place to discuss whether this is appropriate and compatible with EU law. My view is that Eco Swiss permits Member States to restrict their review of awards. Eco Swiss, in deciding that courts must quash an award based on EU public policy if they would quash it based on their domestic public policy, sets a rule of equivalence according to which EU mandatory rules should not be treated differently than EU public policy. It thus permits courts to exercise limited review (or no review at all) of the compliance of an award to both domestic and EU mandatory rules.

Second: It is hard to understand why the need for a coherent and uniform enforcement of EU mandatory laws by courts within the EU is at all relevant in the context of a debate on the revision of the Regulation and the possible suppression of the arbitration exception.

The Heidelberg proposals (in their original version or as they are now amended by Professor Hess) provide no answer to that question because the scope of the Regulation is procedural and does not address issues of substance. Under the Regulation as it could to be amended by the suppression of the exequatur (an evolution that Professor Hess seem to welcome), a judgment having disregarded EU mandatory laws would have to be recognized exactly like a judgment having made a correct application of the same.

Likewise, the Regulation does not address referrals under Article 267 TFEU.

Those issues may be interesting in the context of a discussion on a new instrument providing for a uniform regional regime on arbitration, but they are entirely irrelevant to the revision of the Regulation.

Several years ago, three United States Courts of Appeal contemporaneously dismissed actions to enforce foreign arbitral awards for lack of personal jurisdiction, a development that provoked expressions of concern from the arbitration bar. Adding to their dread, the United States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit dismissed an enforcement action on forum non conveniens grounds in Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. (Monde Re) v. Nak Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002). That decision continues to generate so much opposition that it was singled out for rejection in a draft of the Restatement of the U.S. Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which was publicly discussed at a continuing legal education program sponsored by the American Law Institute in May 2009. Having formerly held (but overcome) similar views, the author of this post reflects on the appropriate use of forum non conveniens doctrine in proceedings to enforce arbitral awards under the New York and Inter-American Conventions.

Because observers tend to forget, one should begin by recalling that Monde Re grew out of a dispute that led to elevated political tensions and raised concerns about energy security in Europe. According to Russia, Ukraine’s state-owned gas concern had made significant, unauthorized withdrawals from pipelines carrying natural gas from Russia to Western Europe. Accepting the allegations as true, a reinsurer (Monde Re) covered the Russian losses and then (as subrogee) brought arbitration proceedings in Moscow against Ukraine’s state-owned gas concern. One year later, the tribunal awarded Monde Re over $88 million by majority vote.

In due course, Monde Re brought enforcement proceedings in New York against Ukraine’s state-owned gas concern and against the Ukrainian government, which was not a party to the underlying contract, had not been joined in the arbitration proceedings, and was not named in the award. As a result Monde Re’s enforcement action did not represent a typical, summary proceeding against the award debtor. Monde Re, 311 F.3d at 500. To the contrary, it sought to establish the Ukrainian government’s responsibility based on veil-piercing theories that were asserted in a politically volatile context and required complex examination of evidence located in East European capitals. Id. at 494-95, 500.

Given the circumstances just described, the Ukrainian government sought dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine, which affords U.S. courts the discretionary power to dismiss cases in the event that (1) there exists an adequate alternative forum, and (2) a combination of private and public interest factors outweighs the plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. forum. After consideration, the district court granted the motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed. In so doing, the Court of Appeals articulated two themes. First, it pointed out that (1) all parties were aliens, (2) who performed the underlying commercial transactions outside the United States, and (3) who resolved their differences through arbitration outside the United States. Monde Re, 311 F.3d at 500. Because those statements might apply to a very large range of enforcement actions under the New York and Inter-American Conventions (and might thus justify liberal use of forum non conveniens dismissals), they understandably provoked expressions of concern among the arbitration bar. Perhaps for that reason, this remains the theme that most observers associate with Monde Re.

Few people recall the Second Circuit’s main theme, which emphasized that the circumstances did not contemplate summary enforcement proceedings against the award debtor, but the extension of liability to a third party based on theories that would require a complex inquiry into politically sensitive relationships documented by evidence located in foreign states, which clearly had stronger interests in the matter. Monde Re, 311 F.3d at 494-95, 500-01. Because that particular factual matrix cried out for the exercise of discretion and does not seem prone to frequent repetition, one may regard Monde Re as a sensible decision that confirms the utility of preserving a limited scope for forum non conveniens dismissals in enforcement proceedings under the New York and Inter-American Conventions.

Subsequent practice indicates that federal judges possess the acumen and restraint needed to apply the forum non conveniens doctrine sensibly in the context of enforcement proceedings. Most recently, in Figueiredo Ferraz Consultoria e Engenharia de Projeto Ltda v. Republic of Peru, 665 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), a firm of consulting engineers received a $21.6 million award against a Peruvian government sponsored program known as “Water for All.” Subsequently, the firm commenced enforcement proceedings against the Republic of Peru in New York under the Inter-American Convention. Seeking to replicate the framework for Monde Re, Peru (1) claimed that the “Water for All” program was a separate legal entity, and (2) sought dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine.

Based on undisputed facts relating to the program’s genesis, financing, management, and function, the court regarded it as a political organ inseparable from the Republic of Peru for purposes of enforcement proceedings under the Inter-American Convention. Figueiredo, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 368-71. With respect to forum non conveniens, the court observed that the private interest factors did not favor dismissal in the context of summary proceedings to enforce arbitration awards, which are heard as motions (as opposed to plenary actions) under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 376, 378. Turning to the public interest factors, the court recognized that the United States has an interest in enforcing foreign arbitral awards under U.S. treaties against respondents who possess substantial assets within the forum. Id. at 376-77. Having previously observed that Peru issued some $13 billion worth of debt securities in New York over the previous seven years, the court saw no reason to dismiss an action brought for the sole purpose of enforcing an award against Peru’s assets in that jurisdiction. Id. at 367, 373, 377.

Assuming that one can overcome visceral reactions to some of its unnecessarily broad language (described above as the first theme), Monde Re demonstrates that forum non conveniens dismissals may serve a constructive purpose in enforcement proceedings under the New York and Inter-American Conventions, albeit on rare occasions. Likewise, Figueiredo suggests that federal judges possess the insight needed to apply the doctrine in sensible ways. Under these circumstances, one feels the temptation to compare the forum non conveniens doctrine to kitchen knives: potentially dangerous, but useful and rarely mishandled.

In post-Soviet time Russian courts have already developed quite a vast practice of recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards. One can even already fetch out some trends in such practice. Thorough case study shows that certain distrust to international arbitration and unexpected obstacles to the enforcement of the awards caused by lack of experience in dealing with foreign-related matters, reflected in some early judgments, gradually go.

In Russia the decisions on requests for enforcement of the arbitral awards made in disputes of commercial or other economic nature are vested with the commercial courts (“arbitrazhnyie sudy”). It should be mentioned that the arbitrazh courts have nothing in common with arbitral (non-state) tribunals, whether domestic or international. So the term “arbitrazh” (“arbitral” in the Russian language) as used in the modern Russian law has two meanings: the first stands for arbitral (non-state) tribunals while the second implies the state commercial courts. This is a particular heritage of the Soviet times, caused by historic peculiarities of domestic regulations.

A new noteworthy case is Venture Global Engineering LLC v. Avtotor-Holding Group OJSC heard by the Commercial Court of Kaliningrad region (court of first instance) and Federal Commercial Court of North-Western Circuit (court of cassation) in 2009. The arguments of the parties in this case as well as the courts’ approach in dealing with them are quite typical for the last years’ cases on foreign arbitral awards enforcement; hence worth special attention. The arbitration took place in Stockholm. On 22 December 2008 the ICC International Arbitration Court consisting of a sole arbitrator in case No. 13756/EBS/VRO ordered the Russian OJSC Avtotor-Holding Group to pay debt from the agency agreement in the amount of 1,233,917 USD, penalty at the rate of 8 % annually till the date the award was rendered, 63,000 USD of arbitration costs and 230,444.94 USD of attorney fees in favor of the US Venture Global Engineering LLC. Furthermore, upon the claimant’s request, the arbitrator obliged the defendant to prepare and provide to the claimant a complete and correct detailed list of items acquired from General Motors Corporation and some other information related to the agency agreement.

The debtor failed to fulfill the award voluntarily and the creditor applied at the Commercial Court of Kaliningrad region for its recognition and enforcement. The court granted recognition and enforcement by its ruling of 27 October 2009 in case No. A21-802/2009. The debtor challenged the court’s ruling at the Federal Commercial Court of North-Western Circuit. The range of grounds for refusal to recognize and enforce an award under the New York Convention being quite limited and the qualification of international arbitrators generally being high, yet as a matter of fact the debtors often advance plenty of reasons to oppose the recognition and enforcement. The case in question illustrates it well. The debtor advanced, to name but a few, the following objections:

1) The arbitrator rejected four of the five respondent’s motions to call for crucial evidence and the motion to demand and hear a witness and thus the respondent was unable to present his case;
2) The recognition and enforcement of the award would be contrary to Russian public policy as:

(a) the arbitrator incorrectly decided on the validity of the agency agreement;
(b) the arbitrator set the agent’s fees while neglecting the facts of the case and the evidence presented by the parties;
(c) the penalty in the amount of 8 % awarded under the law of the state of Michigan constituted punitive damages and was inadequate to the consequences of the breach. Such adequacy is an integral part of the Russian public policy.

However, the court of cassation rejected all the objections and upheld the lower court ruling.

The court clearly stated that the said debtor’s arguments amounted to attempts to review the case on the merits. In particular, the court refused to check the validity of the agency agreement and noted that this issue was fully in the competence of the arbitrator as it fell within the scope of the arbitration clause, and that the arbitrator thoroughly examined such validity. Any objections concerning reconsideration of specific facts of the case established by the arbitral tribunal are irrelevant in the case on the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.

The court dealt in detail with the public policy argument. It is worth mentioning that invoking Russian public policy by debtors in the proceedings on the enforcement of the awards has been very popular. This is due to the past inclination of the Russian courts to broadly interpret this exception. In this case the court expressly mentioned that an essential difference between a foreign law applied by the arbitrator and Russian law does not itself constitute ground to apply the public policy clause. Otherwise it would be impossible to apply foreign law in Russia at all, which would be contrary to the principles of Russian law. ‘Russian public policy’ is a totally different notion than ‘Russian law’ and embraces “the bases of the morality, core economic and cultural traditions which formed Russian society, main religious postulates and fundamental principles of Russian law”.

The court said that the public policy clause may be applied only in cases where the application of foreign law and/or enforcement of the arbitral award can engender a result inadmissible from the viewpoint of the Russian ‘legal sense’. The court held that there is no reason to believe that enforcement of an award of debt and penalty by a Russian company to a foreign company under agency agreement could engender such a result.

The case reflects positive trends in the practice of enforcement of arbitral awards in Russia. Indeed, there are already many a judgment which confirm that a judicial review on the merits of a case resolved by an arbitrator is inadmissible, including the judgments by the High Commercial Court of the Russian Federation which is the court of the highest instance in the system of Russian commercial courts.

In particular, in a recent case the Federal Commercial Court of Moscow Circuit (ruling of 27 August 2009 КГ-А40/8155-09) held that “an argument that the awarded damages amount does not correspond to the principle of adequacy of civil liability measure to the consequences of the breach falls into the merits of the resolved case and does not pertain to the grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment and a foreign arbitral award”. As it happens, understanding the approach of this court is of great importance: many big Russian companies involved in international business are registered in the Russian capital, and thus in accordance with the Russian procedural rules many cases on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards are heard by the Commercial Court of Moscow in the first instance and by the Federal Commercial Court of Moscow Circuit in the cassation instance.

One of the main points illustrated by the above case is that now to oppose a foreign arbitral award recognition and enforcement using the public policy exception the debtor must refer to some grave consequences which such recognition and enforcement would engender in Russia. What such consequences could be is a good subject for a separate discussion.

As I have noted earlier, there is a pitched battle between victims of Pan Am 73 terrorist hijacking over the distribution of treaty funds secured by the United States for American victims in a 2008 diplomatic settlement with Libya. The treaty and Executive Order stipulate that the money shall be distributed solely for the benefit of United States nationals, but foreign nationals are claiming that they are entitled to the overwhelming majority of the funds pursuant to a Joint Prosecution Agreement signed among the passengers of Pan Am 73, most of whom were non-Americans. The American terrorist victims argue that the contract is inapplicable to a diplomatic settlement, and alternatively, that it is void for public policy because the contract cannot contravene the federal policy designed to distribute these funds for American victims, and only American victims. They contend that the JPA places an obstacle in the way of the United States’ efforts to effectuate the comprehensive settlement on behalf of U.S. nationals and undermines the essential purpose of applicable federal law.

Last week, a federal district court judge in Washington, D.C. heard oral arguments on a motion to compel arbitration of this dispute pursuant to an arbitration clause in the Joint Prosecution Agreement. Press reports of the developments are here, here, and here.

One of the most unusual twists in the case is that the implementing statute, the Libyan Claims Resolution Act (“LCRA”), immunizes the assets from “attachment or any other judicial process” before, during, and after the assets are held by the U.S. Department of Treasury for distribution to the American victims. In other words, when Treasury cuts a check to the American victims who succeed before the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, those assets remain immune from attachment or any judicial process. How then can non-American victims attempt to seize those assets pursuant to a contract claim? The answer should be that they cannot. Consistent with the arbitrability doctrine, a competing federal statute overrides the general requirements of the FAA, precluding arbitration of the contract claims.

Serving as an expert consultant on the case on behalf of the American victims, I read this statute as precluding “any judicial process” whatsoever, which includes court proceedings to compel arbitration. Section 4 of the LCRA states that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, any property described [below] … shall be immune from attachment or any other judicial process.” The property is defined as “any property that relates to the [U.S.-Libya] claims agreement” and “for purposes of implementing the claims agreement” is “held by,” “transferred to,” or “transferred from” the Department of Treasury. See 73 Fed. Reg. 50666 (Aug. 27, 2008). Thus, it seems clear that the assets the non-Americans are seeking to attach were immunized by law from “attachment or other judicial process” under the LCRA in order to guarantee that they would reach the intended recipients after they were “transferred from” the Department of Treasury.

During the hearing Judge Bates was very intrigued by the argument, but frankly it was impossible to tell which way he would rule on the arbitrability question. He was particularly interested in hearing that the Department of State was considering filing a Statement of Interest in the case to articulate the federal policy interests that are at stake. The American victims argued that one of the reasons the case should not go to arbitration is that there are clearly established rules requiring federal courts to give deference to such Executive Branch concerns, whereas in arbitration there is no obvious means for the United States to intervene in the arbitration, nor any guarantee that the panel would give the government’s Statement of Interest any weight.

Roger Alford

Professor Hess is the author of the chapter of the Heidelberg Report on the interplay between arbitration and the Regulation 44/2001 (“the Regulation”). As such, and quite understandably, he actively promotes the suggestion that the arbitration exception should be deleted from the Regulation.

The Heidelberg proposal has been followed by a Green Paper of the European Commission and by a public consultation, which has given rise to numerous reactions from the arbitration community. Many of these reactions expressed a variety of serious concerns on the impact that the extension of the scope of the Regulation to arbitration related court litigation could have. Those concerns relate to possible conflicts between the Regulation and the New York Convention due to the automatic recognition of judgments invalidating arbitration clauses and arbitral awards for reasons inconsistent with the New York Convention, as well as to the recognition of judgments inconsistent with an arbitration awards. They also relate to possible lis pendens situations between proceedings initiated in breach of an arbitral award and proceedings to set the arbitration in motion or to enforce an award. Finally, the suggestion that the lis pendens rule of Article 27 of the Regulation could be set aside in case of a declaratory action before the courts of the country where the arbitration has its seat raises legitimate concerns with respect to the negative effect of the competence-competence principle, as well as to the rush to courts that it might provoke (on these concerns, see the responses to the Commission’s public consultation, and in particular the position taken by the International Bar Association Arbitration Committee, see also our previous post on these issues).

Those concerns, according to Prof. Hess, are misplaced. In an article posted on www.conflictsoflaw.net , which will soon be also published in the 2010-1 issue of the Cahiers de l’arbitrage/The Paris Journal of International arbitration, Prof. Hess submits that they stem from a “misunderstanding” of his intentions (footnote 32). He also promises that “the implications of the proposal will be rather limited” and that “the present state of affairs will largely remain unchanged”. With due respect, this is wishful thinking. The deletion of the arbitration exception, if adopted, will on the contrary have profound and unpredictable consequences on the law of arbitration in EU Member States.

Prof. Hess’ is quite keen to convince the arbitration community that his proposal is arbitration friendly. The Heidelberg proposal would indeed be thought to offer post-West Tankers an alternative to anti-suit injunctions in order to protect arbitration against torpedo actions (“the starting point of the Heidelberg Report was the West Tankers decision of the ECJ”). Yet, it is doubtful that drafters’ primary intention was to remedy West Tankers, for the Heidelberg Report was drafted and published many months before the sinking by the ECJ of pro-arbitration anti-suit injunctions. At any rate, there are good reasons to believe that the medicine would be worst than the illness it is suppose to cure.

Prof. Hess’s confidence that his proposal is innocuous seems to be based on the assumption that “the New York Convention provides for a uniform law”, and that there is thus “a general assumption that the courts of its contracting parties will apply its provisions equally”. As all courts of the Union should be trusted in an equal manner, “there is no reason to oblige the courts of a contracting party in a regional framework to verify the validity of the agreement individually”. In other words, mutual trust between Members States would command to give the same deference to all courts decisions in the Union, which may be fine in Aldous Huxley’s best of all worlds, but is probably far from the reality of the Union. Prof. Hess himself recognises, by the way, that the distrust towards State intervention in arbitration proceedings has been caused by “the limited degree of uniformity created by the New York Convention which does not entirely eliminate differences between the national jurisdictions”, which acknowledgement is rather difficult to conciliate with the assumption that the New York Convention “provides for a uniform law”.

Be as it may, there should be no serious argument that there is indeed no “general assumption” that courts in Member States apply the New York Convention “equally”. It is indeed not the case. Quite to the contrary, there are considerable differences in the way different jurisdictions apply the New York Convention. This is, first, because the generality of the terms of the New York Convention permit courts to disregard its spirit while formally complying with its literal terms (for example by applying a wide interpretation of the concept of public policy). And, second, because the New York Convention is not a convention of uniform law (like, for example, the Vienna CISG). Its scope is not to replace the national laws on arbitration, but to provide for a minimal threshold for the enforcement of arbitration agreements and foreign arbitral awards. As such, the Convention permits Member States to apply more favourable rules. In short, the Convention’s application and interpretation falls back on national arbitration law (on the nature of the New York Convention and the more-favourable rule see A. Mourre, A propos des articles V et VII de la Convention de New York et de la reconnaissance des sentences annulées dans leur pays d’origine: où va-t’on après les arrêts Termo Rio et Putrabali ? rev. arb. vol. 2008, Iss. 2 pp. 263-298 ). On the contrary, international works such as the successful UNCITRAL Model Law are model uniform instruments with a defined aim to harmonize national arbitration legislations.

It is in any case rather doubtful that, as submitted by Prof. Hess, “the prevalence of the New York Convention would be ensured by Article 71 JR, guaranteeing the New York Convention’s priority as a so-called ‘special convention’”. If it were so, French courts would retain the possibility of enforcing in France, based on article VII of the New York Convention, an award annulled in another Member State, which is the exact contrary of what the Heidelberg report intends to achieve. Article 71 refers to special conventions relating to court jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in special matters, which arguably does not encompass the New York Convention.

It would therefore be necessary, for the sake of clarity, to add to Article 71 an additional provision stating that: “Nothing in the present Regulation will affect the proper operation of the New York Convention”.

One of the difficulties with the Heidelberg proposals is that it ignores the variety of cultures and legal realities that characterize arbitration. The Heidelberg Report is indeed impregnated by the idea that, if there is a dispute on the validity or enforceability of the arbitration agreement, it is for the courts to decide such dispute upfront. However, such a perspective, which is present in the laws of the United Kingdom and Germany, is totally absent in the French and Swiss perspectives (and Switzerland is now about to adopt the negative effect of Kompetenz-Kompetenz regardless of the seat of the arbitration – see Georg von Segesser/Dorothee Schramm latest post for an update on the legislative works being done in this respect). The way Prof. Hess approaches the problem is telling: the Heidelberg proposal does “not intend to increase satellite or parallel litigation in cases where the arbitration clause is undisputed” [emphasis added]. And he further considers that, would the Heidelberg proposals be adopted, “when the arbitration agreement is undisputed, parties may immediately initiate arbitration proceedings without any recourse to State courts” [emphasis added]. Considering that the parties may start their arbitration if they agree that there is a valid arbitration agreement is hardly an innovative proposition. But the reverse of the medal is interesting: if there is no agreement, courts should step in before the arbitration is started. Of course, from that perspective, the suggested declaratory action fits nicely in the picture.

Prof. Hess concedes that “even if the clause is disputed, Member States shall be free to provide a system of negative competence-competence where the arbitral tribunal decides on the validity of the clause”. This is acknowledged: the Regulation as amended would not invalidate Article 1458 of the French Code of Civil Proceedings. Whilst this might provide some comfort, Prof. Hess is however totally silent on the operation of article 27 of the Regulation in case of a conflict between an action in the merits in breach of the arbitration agreement and an action to put the arbitration in motion before the juge d’appui at the seat of the arbitration (e.g. the French juge d’appui. The question is of course relevant in case of an ad hoc arbitration where the parties did not select an appointing authority).

The easy answer could of course be that the decision of the juge d’appui according to which the arbitration shall proceed is a court decision and is thus able to set aside the lis pendens principle according to the proposed new article 27A. Is that so sure?

The proposed new article 27A is clear: it says that the lis pendens principle will be set aside “if a court of a Member State that is designated as the place of the arbitration in the arbitration agreement is seized for declaratory relief in respect to the existence, the validity, and/or scope of that arbitration agreement”. First, arbitration agreements which do not provide for the seat of the arbitration would be left unprotected. But more importantly, declaratory relief is what it is (unless the Commission intends to change the concept): a declaration, in the present case a declaration that the arbitration agreement is valid or enforceable. A French juge d’appui however takes no such decision. When seized of an action to put the arbitration in motion (and the same applies if the court is seized on the merits), a French court will limit itself to ascertain that the arbitration agreement is not manifestly null and void or inoperable. And this is a very demanding standard for parties who submit that there is such a manifest nullity or inoperability: according to French case law, it can only be so if the alleged nullity or inoperability is evident and does not need any complex analysis of the facts (see recently Cass. 1st Civ. 7 June 2006, Jules Verne c/ Sté ABS, rev. arb. Vol. 2006 Iss. 4, pp. 945 – 953 , note E. Gaillard, JDI Vol. 2006 Iss. 3 pp. 1384, note A. Mourre). Courts have been as far as deciding that the juge d’appui can only declare the arbitration agreement manifestly void or inoperable if there is no possible contrary solution (on this issue, see O. Cachart, Le contrôle de la nullité ou de l’inapplicabilité manifeste de la clause compromissoire, rev. arb. Vol. 2006 Iss. 4, pp. 893 – 908). Otherwise, it is for the arbitral tribunal to decide. There is, in other words, no declaration from the French juge d’appui as to the validity or applicability of the arbitration agreement.

In sum, the proposed new article 27A will not prevent a party having first started merit proceedings in breach of the arbitration agreement, and submitting before the court seized in the merits that the arbitration agreement is manifestly void or inoperative, from relying on the lis pendens rule to impose a stay to the French juge d’appui having to decide that the arbitration agreement is not void or inoperative.

In order for the Heidelberg proposal not to hamper the operation of the negative effect of competenz-competenz, the new Article 27A would have to be drafted as follows:

“A court of a Member State shall stay the proceedings once the defendant contests the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the existence and scope of the arbitration agreement (i) if a court of a Member State that is designated as the place of the arbitration is seized for declaratory relief in respect to the existence, the validity, and/or scope of that arbitration agreement, or (ii) if a judge at the seat of the arbitration has been seized to put the arbitration in motion or has been seized of a difficulty relating to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, or (iii) if an arbitral tribunal, sitting in or outside the European Union, has been seized of said question” (accordingly, see the IBA position paper, § 25-28).

The issue that then arises is of course that many jurisdictions, like France, take quite a liberal approach as to the applicability of the arbitration agreement to non signatories, with the consequence that the above proposition would lead to generalise in the European Union the French arbitration friendly conception that arbitral tribunals have a priority in assessing their own jurisdiction, including with respect to non signatories. Are Prof. Hess and the Commission ready to endorse that principle? That would certainly be a considerable step forward for the laws on arbitration in Europe.

Another aspect of the lis pendens conundrum regards the enforcement of awards. Presumably, Prof. Hess’ proposed Article 27A would prevent any lis pendens situation between an action in the merits in breach of the arbitration agreement and an enforcement action at the seat of the arbitration. As a matter of fact, in case of a dispute on the award’s validity at the seat of the arbitration where a party would base its argument on the invalidity of the arbitration agreement, the court would be required to decide whether said agreement is indeed valid or enforceable, and its decision would be taken as equivalent to the declaration required by the proposed article 27A. But what if enforcement is sought in another country? The proposed Article 27A would then not protect the award and the Regulation’s automatic stay provision would then have the effect of preventing a party from enforcing the award.

It would therefore be necessary to include in the Regulation a new Article 27B as follows: “Article 27 shall not apply to the court of a Member State requested to enforce an arbitration award” (accordingly, the IBA position paper, § 40).

Finally Article 34 of the Regulation would need to be amended so to avoid the automatic recognition of judgments having disregarded a valid arbitration award or annulled an arbitral award on the basis of local standards. A new article 34A would therefore need to be included, as follows:

“A judgement shall also not be recognised:

a) if it has been rendered in disregard of an arbitration agreement that is valid under the law of the country of recognition;
b) as regards judgments rendered on the validity of an award, if (i) it has not been rendered by the courts of the country where the arbitration has its seat, or (ii) in case of annulment of the award, if it was not made on one of the grounds set out in Article V (1) (a) to (d) of the New York Convention” (accordingly, see the IBA position paper, § 40).

Encore un effort, Messieurs les réformateurs….

In holding that “Article 85 of the [EU] Treaty [now article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU] constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning of the internal market”, and that “the provisions of Article 85 of the Treaty may be regarded as a matter of public policy within the meaning of the New York Convention”, the European Court of Justice in Eco Swiss (Case C-126/97, 1 June 1999) has created the potential for a flood of challenges against awards for alleged misapplications of the law of competition. The risk caused for arbitration by the characterisation of European competition law as a matter of public policy under the New York Convention has further increased with the growing acceptance and importance of economics in competition policy and decision making, for economic thinking and economics models have never proven to be perfect guides, and may lead to highly unpredictable results. In addition, economic analysis is fundamentally fact-driven and the marriage between competition law and the doctrine of public policy in arbitration inevitably has the potential to lead the reviewing court to revisit the case on the merits. Being a matter of public policy, it may be considered that the arbitral tribunal’s findings should not bind the court reviewing the award. In addition, bad faith litigators are rewarded, as European courts will generally entertain a challenge based on competition law even if the complaining party never raised any such argument during the arbitration proceedings. Finally, given the broad scope of competition law, any award based on a contract of a certain importance may be challenged on the basis of a market power analysis showing that said contract has the effect of distorting the proper functioning of competition on the relevant markets. Then, instead of performing a limited review of the award, the court finds itself dragged into a complex dispute which may never have been argued before, where it is requested to review massive evidence, including expert reports, on market shares, structure of prices, etc…

It is clear that challenges of awards based on alleged distortions of competition have the potential of frustrating the parties of what they bargained for by agreeing to arbitrate: a one stop shop allowing them to resolve their dispute in a fast, efficient and final manner. A balance thus needs to be found between the principle of finality of awards and the public interest to an effective protection of competition. In France, the trend has been set by the famous Thalès case, where the Paris court of appeal found that an award can be quashed only where its solution entails an “effective and flagrant” violation of international public policy. Although criticised by certain authors as an undue limitation to the court’s powers to review the award under substantive public policy, the limited control posited by Thalès has now been endorsed in different ways by two recent court decisions in France and Belgium.

The first decision was rendered by the Court of Appeal of Brussels on 22 June 2009 and is part of the SNF v. Cytec saga. The other is from the French Court of Appeal of Paris and was handed down on 22 October 2009 in Halyvourgiki v. Linde. Both decisions confirm in different ways that courts should exercise restraint when entertaining a challenge based on an alleged breach of European competition law.

The SNF v. Cytec dispute (on which, A. Mourre and L. Radicati di Brozolo, Revue de l’arbitrage, 2007, 304 and A. Mourre, Revue de l’arbitrage, 2009, 594) arises from the termination by SNF of a long term supply agreement of a raw material called AMD, based on its alleged anti-competitive effects. The contract provided for ICC arbitration in Brussels. Cytec started an arbitration with the aim of challenging the contract’s termination and seeking damages, and SNF alleged before the arbitrators that the contract not only violated Article 81 EC [now article 101 of the TFEU] but was also an abuse of its dominant market position. Two awards were rendered in Brussels in 2002 and 2004 under the aegis of the ICC rules. The arbitrators decided in a partial award that one of the contracts indeed violated Article 81 of the EC Treaty since it had the effect of foreclosing SNF from the AMD market. The tribunal also decided that both parties were responsible for the nullity of the contract and that liability should thus be equally shared between them. In the final award, the tribunal nevertheless held that SNF had not established its losses and thus awarded damages only to Cytec, in an amount that roughly matched those that such company had initially sought for the termination of the contract.

SNF challenged the decisions on the basis that the award of damages to Cytec in an amount roughly equivalent to its initial claim amounted to giving effects to the annulled contract, and that in so doing the tribunal breached Articles 81 and 82. On 8 March 2007, the Tribunal of Brussels quashed the awards on the basis that the tribunal’s reasoning was inconsistent for it had on the one hand admitted that the contract was contrary to public policy and on the other hand awarded Cytec damages in amount equivalent to those that it had initially sought to compensate its allegedly wrongful termination. It is worth noting that, in parallel, Cytec had sought the enforcement of the awards in France and obtained its exequatur from the court of Paris. After subsequent proceedings, the Paris court of appeal (23 March 2006) and the French Supreme Court (4 June 2008, Clunet 2008, 1107, note A. Mourre) rejected SNF’s challenges against the exequatur by holding that enforcement of a foreign award could only be denied in case of a “flagrant and effective” violation of international public policy, that the solution given to the dispute by the awards did not materialise such a flagrant breach, and that SNF’s allegations that the contract had anti-competitive effects amounted to an attempt to reopen a debate on the merits that had been finally settled by the arbitrators.

Indeed, at this stage of proceedings, the decisions of the French court of cassation and the Belgian first instance tribunal illustrated the stark opposition between the so-called minimalist and maximalist approaches of the award’s scrutiny. The French position was certainly in accord with the dominant view, in and outside the European Union, that awards should only be quashed in case of manifest and egregious breaches of international public policy. In Switzerland, it is well known that the Swiss Federal Tribunal held in Tensacciai (TFS, 8 March 2006) that awards can only be quashed in case of breach of the most fundamental principles which form the basis of any legal order, and that competition law is not part of such “truly” international public policy. In the United States, courts have repeatedly upheld a pro-arbitration stance and decided that the award can only be quashed for breach of the law on competition if the arbitrator purposely ignored it when making the award (U.S. Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, American Central Eastern Texas Gas Company v. Union Pacific Resources Group and Duke Energy). In another case, the 7th Circuit found that a mistake in the arbitral tribunal’s application of the competition law is not a ground on which to set aside an award (16 Jan. 2003, Baxter International Inc. v. Abbott). The High Court of New Zealand has also endorsed minimal review of awards under competition law (Gvt. Of New Zealand v. Mobil Oil, YCA 1988, 638). In Italy, both the court of appeal of Milan in Tensacciai (8 March 2006) and Florence (Nuovo Pignone, 21 March 2006) clearly stated that the scrutiny should be limited to verifying that the arbitrators duly considered the competition law issues and held that a misapplication of such rules is not tantamount to a violation of international public policy. In Sweden, the Svea court of appeal held in 2005 (Rep. of Latvia v. Latvijas Gaze) that the concept of public policy should be given a narrow application in the context of the review of an arbitral award and that a violation of competition law can only lead to an annulment in “obvious cases”. Although there is to our knowledge no case dealing precisely with a challenge based on European antitrust law in England, the Court of appeal in Westacre has clearly set the yardstick in favour of finality. Case law in Germany is still unsettled, with decisions in favour (OLG Düsseldorf, 21 July 2004) and against (OLG Thüringen, 8 August 2007) an in-depth review of the arbitrators findings, but well known authorities have supported the Thalès approach (P. Schlosser, Articles 81 and 82 EC-Treaty and Arbitration: A German Perspective, Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 2009-1, 25). Likewise, in Spain, although we are not aware of any case on point, leading judges have clearly expressed the view that court review of awards should be limited to the most egregious breaches of public policy and should never lead the court to revisit the arbitrators’ findings as to the facts of the case (A. G. de Paredes, L’annulation des sentences arbitrales en Espagne: à propos de la non révision au fond des sentences et du contrôle du respect de l’ordre public en droit espagnol: Cahiers de l’arbitrage, 2007-3, 27).

From that perspective, the stand of the Brussels court of first instance in SNF in favour of an in-depth review of the arbitrators’ findings in order to ensure a proper application of the law on competition was certainly isolated. To our knowledge, only once has a court entered into the exercise of revisiting the arbitrators’ findings in the merits (Court of appeal of The Hague, 24 March 2005, Marketing Displays International, for a critical analysis, A. Mourre and L. Radicati di Brozolo, Towards Finality of Arbitral Awards: Two Steps Forward and One Step Back, JOIA 2006, 180). Belgian courts have however now joined the mainstream pro-arbitration approach by annulling the Brussels court of first instance ill-grounded annulment decision.

In a 22 June 2009 decision, the Brussels’ Court of appeal (Revue de l’arbitrage 2009, 574, with a note by A. Mourre), has in fact clearly confirmed that “the judge before which the award is challenged should not verify the accuracy of the arbitrators’ reasoning and cannot substitute his own valuation of the case to that of the arbitral tribunal. The Court of appeal adds that “the mission of the judge reviewing an award is to verify the regularity and the legality of the award: as a matter of principle, the review has to be performed to the exclusion of any revisiting of the merits of the case and only on the limited grounds set by Article 1704 of the Judicial Code if any such ground has been invoked”. And it rightly concludes that “the grounds developed by a party which pursues a complete revisiting of the merits of the case by asking the judge to reassess the consequences of the nullity of a contract in a manner different than the arbitrators’ appraisal are not part of public policy”.

The Brussels Court of appeal approach is thus very close to that of French courts, as confirmed by a very recent and unpublished 22 October 2009 decision of the Paris Court of appeal in Linde Aktiengesellschaft v. Halyvourgiki. The two companies had entered into an agreement for the production of liquid gas by Linde in a steel plant belonging to Halyvourgiki, the gas being destined to the industrial needs of said plant. While Halyvourgiki argued that the contract included an implied exclusivity provision preventing Linde to sell the gas to other customers, Linde submitted that no such exclusivity provision had been agreed between the parties. Linde however raised before the arbitral tribunal no argument based on the invalidity of the alleged exclusivity agreement under the rules of competition. In its award, the arbitral tribunal found that, based on trade customs in these type of contracts for the production of gas on the customer’s site, the manufacturer is indeed under the obligation to reserve the full production made on site to the owner of the plant. The award was challenged before the Paris Court of appeal by Linde, who raised at this stage and for the first time the argument that the implied exclusivity agreement was a vertical restraint and that, given the parties’ shares of the relevant market, it did not fall under the relevant block exception. Linde also submitted that the implied exclusivity provision had the effect of distorting the operation of the liquid gas market in Greece and led to an increase in prices and to reinforcing the market power of its main competitors. The argument was based on lengthy and highly complex expert reports analysing the structure of the liquid gas market in Greece and in Europe, the structure of the prices, and the evolution of the main gas manufacturers’ market shares over a span of several years both in Greece and in Europe. Linde’s argument was disputed by Halyvourgiki both on the basis of arbitration law (the alleged misapplication of European competition law is not ground for quashing the award) and on the ground of competition law (as Halyvourgiki disagreed with Linde’s economic analysis, notably the identification of the relevant market and the parties’ market shares).

It should also be noted that the case was much more driven by economic analysis than Thalès was, for the exclusivity in dispute was a vertical restraint (as opposed to a horizontal one) which did not imply any breach per se of the law on competition but an alleged illegality based on the economic effects of the transaction.

In its decision, the Court of appeal fully endorsed the Thalès doctrine and held that the challenge amounted to an attempt to reopen a debate on the merits which should have taken place before the arbitral tribunal, that the control was restricted to the solution given tot the dispute by the arbitral tribunal in its award, and that the alleged anti-competitive effects of the agreement in dispute did not amount to a flagrant and manifest breach of international public policy.

The thrust of both the Brussels and Paris courts decision is that the award, if rendered by a competent arbitral tribunal in a regular procedure where both parties had the benefit of due process, has an intrinsic authority which should be acknowledged and recognised as such by the reviewing judge. There is nothing revolutionary there, as this is exactly the basis upon which the doctrine of private international law has established limited review of foreign judgments since more than fifty years. From that perspective, the limited review of awards under substantive public policy differs from the control performed by courts as to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. In fact, the authority of the award supposes that is has been rendered on a valid arbitral agreement. This explains why the nature of the limited review of awards under substantive public policy is sometimes characterized as “extrinsic”, as opposed to the review of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction, which is “intrinsic” in the sense that it implies a review of the reasons given by the arbitrators to establish their jurisdiction.

Alexis Mourre